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Vision perception is ambiguous and visual arts play with these ambiguities. While perceptual ambiguities
are resolved with prior constraints, artistic ambiguities are resolved by conventions. Is there a relation-
ship between priors and conventions? This review surveys recent work related to these ambiguities in
composition, spatial scale, illumination and color, three-dimensional layout, shape, and movement.
While most conventions seem to have their roots in perceptual constraints, those conventions that differ
from priors may help us appreciate how visual arts differ from everyday perception.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.I believe it is only by considering these psychological aspects of
image making and image reading that we may come closer to an
understanding of the central problem of the history of art [...], that
is, why representation should have a history; why it should have
taken mankind so long to arrive at a plausible rendering of visual
effects that create the illusion of life-likeness; and why artists such
as John Constable, who strove to be true to his vision, still had to
admit that no art is ever free of convention.
Sir Ernst Gombrich (1960), p. 291
Art and Illusion1. Introduction
Every vision scientist has an opinion about visual arts, appar-
ently all of them different, and these opinions are frequently put
forward in lectures and books. Most visual artists have a reciprocal
interest in visual perception, although, in contrast, they rarely tour
universities offering lessons on visual perception. Yet both vision
scientists and artists have in common the passion to uncover the
mysteries of visual perception, either to understand its mecha-
nisms or to better communicate a message. While there are still
relatively few scientiﬁc papers on the perception of visual arts,
there is a growing number of books preaching that scientists and
artists should look more often at each other’s work (Gregory & Har-
ris, 1995; Hecht, Schwartz, & Atherton, 2003; Livingstone, 2002;
Maffei & Fiorentini, 1995; Zeki, 1999). Several of these books grewll rights reserved.out of the enthusiasm that has followed the rapid advances in
knowledge about how humans perceive, especially from the point
of view of visual neuroscience. Even though some of this knowl-
edge is likely to be necessary for a better understanding of the per-
ception of visual arts, it is clearly not sufﬁcient. The question of
interest, in personal terms, is what is different when I look at an
artist’s painting compared to when I look at my kitchen appliances.
Knowing that the same mechanisms are at work when I decipher
the shape and color of objects in a Turner painting and in my
microwave oven is not a satisfyingly complete answer.
One important difference between the perception of visual arts
and what could be called ‘‘everyday perception” is the task of the
observer. Vision scientists know very well the importance of spec-
ifying precisely the task of their participants, even when it is as
simple as detecting or discriminating a small grey patch (Watson
& Robson, 1981). In everyday perception, the task of the observer
is well deﬁned, often by the action that the perception supports.
As we watch the incoming trafﬁc before crossing the road, our per-
ception of the trafﬁc is oriented to the extraction of useful informa-
tion such as the recognition of a car and the estimation of its speed,
while at the same time disregarding irrelevant information such as
the make or color of the car. Once the task is established, one can
deﬁne the decisions necessary to perform it, and if one so wishes,
the efﬁciency of the observer in this task can be computed by nor-
malizing the performance to that of the ideal observer for this task
(Barlow, 1962). Moreover, because these everyday perceptions are
linked to a decision, we can describe the cost of making the wrong
decision and thus study perception under risk (Landy, Goutcher,
Trommershäuser, & Mamassian, 2007). It is more difﬁcult to iden-
tify an appropriate task in the perception of visual arts, or indeed to
agree that there is one. Without specifying a task, the question of
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the notion of risk associated to an alleged wrong perception be-
comes meaningless.
One way to identify a plausible task in visual arts perception is
to return to the challenges of everyday perception. One major issue
is that sensory information is inherently ambiguous, a single image
being consistent with an inﬁnite number of three-dimensional
scenes. To resolve the ambiguities of the retinal images, one can
approach visual perception as an inference problem (Gregory,
1980; Rock, 1983): what is the most likely scene in front of the ob-
server given the retinal information? In its contemporary formula-
tion, perceptual inferences are cast within a Bayesian framework,
and the inference problem is solved thanks to additional knowl-
edge referred to prior constraints (Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille,
2004). For instance, the luminance gradient on an object provides
ambiguous information about its shape but a prior knowledge that
the light source is located above the observer will resolve the shape
ambiguity.
Is visual arts perception subject to ambiguities similar to that
faced in everyday perception?We shall argue that ambiguity reduc-
tion is indeed an important task of visual arts perception. The impor-
tance of ambiguity in the perception of art has been appreciated
before, for instance by Semir Zeki: ‘‘Great art is that which corre-
sponds to as many different concepts in as many different brains
over as long a period of time as possible. Ambiguity is such a prized
characteristic of all great art because it can correspond to many dif-
ferent concepts.” (Zeki, 2002, p. 67). Everyday perception and visual
arts perception seemto share thebasic task of resolving ambiguities,
but in ways that may be very different. While everyday perception
uses prior knowledge, visual arts use conventions. These conven-
tions may take their inspiration from visual prior knowledge but
they can also be completely arbitrary. Take for instance the conven-
tion for thedepictionof thehumanﬁgure inancient Egyptianart: the
head, arms and legs are shown in a proﬁle view, whereas the shoul-
ders and torso face forward. In so doing, Egyptian artists violated the
constraints of possible human contortions,maybe for the purpose of
removing the ambiguity of the person’s identity by displaying each
body part in its most informative pose. Because artistic conventions
are different across periods, across cultures, and across human
development, the appreciation of art will necessarily vary from
one person to the next.
The present review will emphasize the nature of the ambigu-
ities common in everyday and art perception, and compare the
conventions used in visual arts with the prior knowledge used
in everyday perception. In the interest of presenting a reasonable
size and coherent review, the scope will be restricted to topics
directly linked to visual perception and the focus will be on re-
search done in the last decade or so. To focus on perception, this
review will not discuss more cognitive aspects of picture under-
standing (Solso, 1994; Willats, 1997) or the emotional responses
to art (recently reviewed by Silvia, 2005). The review will also be
restricted to behavioral studies of perception, and so will not ad-
dress the emerging ﬁeld of neuroesthetics that concerns the
search for the neural substrates of aesthetics experience (Kawa-
bata & Zeki, 2004; Solso, 2001). Finally, because they merit re-
views on their own, the review will not cover two topics that
could ﬁnd their place here, that of face perception (see the book
by Bruce and Young (1998) and the recent review by Rhodes
(2006)) and that of eye-movements (recently discussed by Con-
way & Livingstone, 2007).2. Composition
Composition refers to the way objects are arranged relative to
each other and relative to the frame. Composition serves multiplepurposes, from improving the harmony of the painting to helping
understand the scene. Harmony is inﬂuenced by the way objects
in the painting relate to each other, how similar repetitive patterns
group together and how some ﬁgures segregate from the back-
ground. Which objects group together and which part of the image
constitute the background are ambiguous relationships that Ge-
stalt psychologists have helped disentangle with their principles
of perceptual organization. For instance, the preference to see ob-
jects of similar orientations group together may be related to some
statistical regularities of our environment (Elder & Goldberg, 2002;
Geisler, Perry, Super, & Gallogly, 2001).
Are these visual prior expectations also conventions in visual
arts? In a very inﬂuential book, Arnheim (1954) took these Gestalt
principles and searched for correspondences in the visual arts. He
argued that such principles were indeed present in paintings, and
he emphasized several principles such as the power of balance
where the depicted objects are distributed around the canvas, for
instance by using symmetrical arrangements. Pinna (2007) is cur-
rently pursuing this Gestalt view of visual arts perception. How-
ever, other research groups have addressed the issue of whether
compositional balance is really critical to distinguish a masterwork
from other more regular paintings and they have found mixed re-
sults (Locher, 2003; Vartanian, Martindale, Podsiadlo, Overbay, &
Borkum, 2005). In this kind of studies, there is always the danger
that the observer already knows the painting, or at least recognizes
the style of the painter, so that rating judgments can be related to
familiarity rather than anything else. In an attempt to objectify and
quantify the importance of composition, several experimenters
have thus turned towards modern art. The advantage of using
modern paintings such as the tri-color compositions of Piet Mon-
drian is that one can easily manipulate several dimensions inde-
pendently. By changing the size, location and color of individual
rectangles in a Mondrian-like stimulus, some combinations are
systematically perceived more balanced (Locher, Overbeeke, &
Stappers, 2005), but generic and robust principles of good compo-
sition are difﬁcult to extract.
Another aspect of composition is to help the observer look for
meaningful information in the canvas. The ambiguity here lies in
the multiple locations in the paintings where attention can be
caught. From a visual point of view, it appears that salient points
in the image, deﬁned primarily by low-level features such as
high-contrast edges, will a priori be the best candidates for visual
attention (Itti & Koch, 2001). These visual prior locations appear
to be very different from the compositional conventions encoun-
tered in visual arts, where some locations in the canvas have a
privileged status. One ﬁrst example of a location with special sta-
tus was described by Tyler (1998, 2007a) in a study of Western
art portraits. Based on the analysis of numerous portraits covering
over four centuries, Tyler noticed a high likelihood that one eye of
the portrait fell near the vertical midline. Whether this predomi-
nance is merely the result of geometrical constraints and whether
there is an aesthetic advantage for those portraits following this
principle are issues still being debated (McManus & Thomas,
2007; Tyler, 2007b).
A second example of a location in the canvas that has a special
status can be found in paintings that use one-point perspective. In
these paintings, there is a single vanishing point on the canvas that
corresponds to the far end of a set of parallel lines in space whose
orientation is roughly orthogonal to the canvas. The location of the
vanishing point appears to be the place to put an object of major
importance. For instance, in ‘‘The School of Athens” by Raphael
(1510–1511) that displays more than twenty famous Greek philos-
ophers, the vanishing point lies intentionally in between the two
main characters, on the book Timaeus that Plato on the left gives
to his student Aristotle on the right (Fig. 1a). There might be a good
technical reason to attract the attention of the observer to the van-
Fig. 1. (a) Illustration of one-point perspective. The two most important characters, Plato and Aristotle are placed next to the vanishing point. Raphael (1510–1511) ‘‘The
School of Athens”. Fresco, Palazzi Pontiﬁci, Vatican. (b) Anomalous perspective for spheres. The whole scene is carefully following the laws of linear perspective, except for
these two spheres that should have an oblong form in the image. Bottom right detail of the same fresco.
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would then move in front of the vanishing point, and thus get clo-
ser to the center of projection where the scene can be perceived
without any three-dimensional deformation (see section on
Three-dimensional layout below). There are of course alternative
explanations for placing objects of importance near the vanishing
point. One alternative explanation is that, because of a well-known
optical illusion, objects tend to appear bigger near the vanishing
point, so this placement will artiﬁcially magnify the size of the ob-
jects. Another alternative explanation is that the vanishing point
tends to be placed close to the center of the painting, so the power
of the center might be sufﬁcient to justify the placement of impor-
tant objects at that location.
In summary on composition, the harmony of multiple objects in
visual arts may have similar characteristics as the Gestalt princi-
ples of organization, but the placement of individual objects of
importance in a painting appears to follow conventions that are
quite different from everyday visual expectations.
3. Spatial scale
While composing a painting, the issue arises as to how best rep-
resent both large and small objects. This scaling problem is exacer-
bated when observers move closer or further away, thereby
revealing or discarding different levels of details. The impact of the
viewing distance is best characterized with the spatial frequency
description of the painting. The high spatial frequency range repre-
sent the ﬁne details of the image, whereas the low spatial frequen-
cies are associated to the coarse information. Getting closer to a
painting will therefore reveal high spatial frequencies that were be-
foreoutside the rangeof frequencies thehumanvisual system is sen-
sitive to (typically represented by the contrast sensitivity function).
Another action thatwill reveal high spatial frequencies is tomake an
eye movement towards a region of interest. Because spatial resolu-
tion is highest in the fovea and gradually decreases as one gets to
the periphery, some ﬁne details will only be visible when the obser-
ver is looking straight at that part of the image.
Because the painter does not know exactly where the observer
will stand and where she will look, there is an ambiguity on the
spatial frequencies of the painting that will actually be seen bythe observer. In natural scenes, all spatial frequencies are available
with a distribution that is independent of the observer’s position.
This distribution is well described as ‘‘1/f”, that is the power spec-
tral density is inversely proportional to the spatial frequency (Field,
1987). In other words, a natural image is largely dominated by low
spatial frequencies (coarse blobs), and higher frequencies (ﬁner de-
tails) are gradually less present. It is likely that the human visual
system has adapted to these statistics of the natural environment
and that the 1/f spatial frequency distribution is the one expected
by the observer as she looks at an image.
Is the dominance for low spatial frequencies also a convention
in visual arts? One could argue that Impressionists were possibly
aware of the asymmetric role of low and high spatial frequencies,
since by emphasizing large brush strokes, the interpretation of
the painting was mostly carried out by the low spatial frequencies.
However, it appears that some painters prefer to maintain a certain
ambiguity in the interpretation. Maybe the most celebrated exam-
ple of ambiguity in a painting is the enigmatic smile of the portrait
of ‘‘Mona Lisa” painted by da Vinci (1503–1506). Livingstone
(2000, 2002) has argued that the ambiguity of the facial emotion
resulted from the superposition of two conﬂicting information in
two different spatial frequency bands. A smile is clearly visible
when only the low spatial frequencies are considered but a more
neutral emotion is seen when all spatial frequencies are consid-
ered. Livingstone thus proposed that the ambiguity of Mona Lisa’s
smile will be most striking when an observer makes an eye move-
ment looking ﬁrst at the mouth and then at the eyes. When the
mouth is seen in visual periphery, only the low spatial frequency
information is available and the interpretation of the emotion is
a smile. To quantify the fact that the change of emotion came
mostly from the mouth region, other authors have added random
luminance noise in the lower region of Mona Lisa’s face and used
the classiﬁcation image technique to localize the relevant informa-
tion (Kontsevich & Tyler, 2004).
The techniqueof adding luminancenoise to a painting is interest-
ingbecause itmasks some informationandpreservesother informa-
tion. This techniquewasmodiﬁed ina studybyBonnar,Gosselin, and
Schyns (2002) who presented an ambiguous painting masked by
occluders of various sizes. The chosen painting was the ‘‘Slave Mar-
ketwith the Disappearing Bust of Voltaire” (Fig. 2a) by Salvador Dali
Fig. 2. (a) Ambiguous painting. The bust of Voltaire is perceived if one focuses on the coarse scale (or look from a far distance) and two nuns are perceived instead if one
focuses on the ﬁne scale (or look very close). Salvador Dali (1940) ‘‘Slave Market with the Disappearing Bust of Voltaire” (grey-scaled detail). Oil on canvas, 46.5  65.5 cm;
Salvador Dali Museum, St. Petersburg, Florida. (b) The low spatial frequency (coarse) information used by observers when they reported seeing the bust of Voltaire. (c) The
higher spatial frequency (ﬁne) information used by observers when they reported seeing two nuns. Reproduced from Bonnar et al. (2002).
Fig. 3. Unnoticed impossible shadows. There are multiple inconsistencies in this
painting that are only visible if one pays close attention to the details. For instance,
light is coming from the right but the statue in the left corner of the building cast a
shadow on the right, and there are inconsistent shadows of the beams cast on the
wall. Konrad Witz (1444) ‘‘Adoration of the Magi”. Panel, 132  154 cm; Musée
d’Art et d’Histoire, Geneva.
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way to two nuns when one pays attention to the ﬁne details of the
painting.Observerswerepresentedwithaseriesof imageseach time
masked by a different set of occluders and they had to report
whether they saw the Voltaire or the nuns interpretation. Then,
the authors reconstructed the visible parts of the image that led to
the Voltaire interpretation (Fig. 2b) and the image that led to the
nuns interpretation (Fig. 2c). As expected, theVoltaire interpretation
involved mostly the low spatial frequencies of the image whereas
the nuns interpretation involved higher spatial frequencies.
An alternative interpretation for both Mona Lisa’s enigmatic
smile and the disappearing bust of Voltaire comes from the ambig-
uous interpretation of the shadows in the paintings. Leonardo da
Vinci took great troubles to depict highly saturated shadows
around the mouth thanks to the delicate sfumato technique which
consists in overlaying multiple translucent layers of paint (Elias &
Cotte, 2008). The smile of Mona Lisa at low spatial frequencies
comes from the large shadows of her cheekbones. If these shadows
were properly interpreted, they could be discounted when the ob-
server looks at the mouth, and thus the emotion of the mouth
should not change when one considers different frequency bands.
Similarly, the nuns in Dali’s painting are deﬁned from the shadows
of the brow ridges and cheekbones of Voltaire, providing the hats
and the dresses of the nuns. One sees Voltaire when the dark re-
gions of the painting are interpreted as shadows and the two nuns
when they are interpreted as dark surface material. By default,
shadows tend to form large dark areas in a painting and as such
contribute to the low spatial frequency information of the image.
If these shadows are placed in speciﬁc areas (near the mouth in
Mona Lisa and under the brow ridge in the disappearing bust of
Voltaire), they can lose their role as shadows and offer an ambigu-
ity to the interpretation of the painting.
In summary, natural scenes have a characteristic distribution of
spatial frequencies and ﬁgurative art, to appear more natural, will
necessarily match this prior distribution. However some artists
have played cunningly with the spatial frequency contents of the
painting to maintain some ambiguous interpretations. Other paint-
ers, such as abstract artists who freed themselves from representa-
tional depictions, have produced paintings that have a frequency
distribution very different from that of natural images, and this
convention on spatial frequency is a characteristic of their style.
4. Illumination and color
Rare are the paintings where the light source is depicted on the
canvas. For all the other paintings, not knowing the location of thelight source leads to ambiguities on the shape of objects, and not
knowing the nature of the illuminant leads to ambiguities on the
colors of objects. Naturally, these ambiguities are also present in
everyday perception, and several prior constraints have been pro-
posed to overcome these ambiguities. For instance, it is assumed
that there is only one stationary light source in the scene (Mamas-
sian, Knill, & Kersten, 1998) and that it is sufﬁciently diffuse so that
color variations are due to changes in the surface materials rather
than the illuminant (Brainard, 1997).
Do conventions in visual arts follow the perceptual priors for
illumination and color? The placement of the illuminant has con-
fused artists until the Renaissance, to the point that shadows were
completely absent in paintings for centuries (Casati, 2004). Let us
take the example of the ‘‘Adoration of the Magi” by Konrad Witz
(Fig. 3). The artist was rightly appreciated for his mastering of
shadows that presented ﬁne geometrical details and nice penum-
bras (Stoichita, 1997). However a closer look at this painting shows
several inconsistencies in the positions and forms of the shadows.
For instance, the two statues at the corner of the building cast their
shadow on the right and the left, something that is impossible un-
less there are two light sources in the scene.
Fig. 4. Analyzing impossible shadows. (a) This surrealist painting offers shadows with ﬁne detailed shapes. Yves Tanguy (1942) ‘‘Indeﬁnite Divisibility”. Oil on canvas,
102  89 cm; Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Buffalo, NY. (b) To determine the consistency of the light direction, one can trace constraint lines between identiﬁable object features
and their cast shadow. Reprinted from Mamassian (2004).
P. Mamassian / Vision Research 48 (2008) 2143–2153 2147Interestingly, these impossible shadows are not noticed, unless
one voluntarily scrutinizes the painting (Fig. 4; Mamassian, 2004).
Therefore, these inconsistencies do not take anything away from
the quality of the painting, but allow the artist to emphasize the
really important aspects of the painting. In other words, ‘‘the artist
can take shortcuts, presenting cues more economically, and
arranging surfaces and lights to suit the message of the piece
rather than the requirements of the physical world.” (Cavanagh,
2005). In contrast to the visual assumption that there is a single
light source in the scene, the profusion of improbable or impossible
shadows in western arts suggests that artists prefer to depict shad-
ows as if there were multiple light sources, rather than having a
shadow cross an object of interest.
The positions of shadows are constrained by the light source po-
sition. Human observers assume that light is coming from above
their head, but also, and more surprisingly, slightly from the left
(for a review, see Mamassian, 2004). Is this perceptual preference
for a light on the left also a convention in the visual arts? There
might be such a predominance for purely practical reasons. For in-
stance, in his Elements of Drawing, John Ruskin wrote ‘‘Sit so thatFig. 5. Predominance of paintings lit from the left in the Louvre museum in Paris. (a) Po
artist and whose head or body occupied most of the canvas. (b) All paintings other than po
that was not categorized as a portrait. Color code: red is left lighting, yellow is right ligh
straight above and other illumination conditions that were impossible to categorize asthe light may come from the left, else the shadow of the pencil
point interferes with your sight of your work.” (Ruskin, 1857, p.
49). However, there might also be an aesthetic preference for a pre-
dominance of left light in paintings. By looking at some paintings
in a mirror, Metzger (1936) has speculated that when the painting
had the light coming from the left, it was more aesthetically pleas-
ing than when light was from the right.
In an effort to quantify the predominance of paintings in the
Western world where the light source is on the left, the paintings
of the Louvre museum were surveyed by taking all the 659 paint-
ings in their current catalogue (Mettais, 2002; see also McManus,
Buckman, & Woolley, 2004). The paintings were sorted by periods,
covering seven centuries from the 13th to the 19th century. They
were also sorted in 194 portraits (Fig. 5a) and 465 non-portraits
(Fig. 5b), the latter category including landscapes but also groups
of people. Each painting was analyzed to see whether light was
coming from the left, the right, or a general category called ‘‘non-
speciﬁc” that included illumination from straight above, from the
middle of the canvas (e.g. from a candle), or from inconsistent or
multiple light sources. On average across all periods, the portraitsrtraits. This category corresponded to the painting of a single person posing for the
rtraits. This category included landscapes, groups of people, and in general anything
ting, and orange corresponds to a ‘‘non-speciﬁc” category that included lights from
left or right light source positions.
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the right (6.2 percent from a non-speciﬁc direction), and the non-
portraits were lit 67.3 percent of the time from the left and 23.0
percent from the right (9.7 percent non-speciﬁc). There was there-
fore an overwhelming predominance of paintings lit from left, and
this bias was even more pronounced in portraits than in other
paintings. The stronger bias for portraits is maybe not that surpris-
ing if we presume that portraits are in general more subject to con-
ventions and studio constraints than outdoor scenes. In addition, it
seems that this bias to the left for the light source position reached
its peak between the 16th and the 18th century. Before that period,
illumination conditions were not necessarily coherent in the scene,
and after that period, artists started to free themselves from im-
posed conventions.
The choice of the light source position has an effect on the
three-dimensional shape depicted. The problem of recovering
shape-from-shading is under-constrained in the sense that the
amount of light reﬂected by a surface is the result of the combina-
tion of the light intensity, the color of the surface and the orienta-
tion of the surface relative to the light source. From a perceptual
point of view, shading remains a rather weak cue because of the
ambiguity resulting from these multiple combinations (Mamassian
& Kersten, 1996). In visual arts, the chiaroscuro technique from the
Renaissance has helped provide a sense of shape from shading by
the careful use of light contrasts, highlights and shadows. How-
ever, some ambiguities remain, in particular to differentiate the
color of the surface and the intensity of the light source. For in-
stance in engravings, artists were faced with hard choices to depict
objects that varied both in color and in amount of reﬂected light
(Zavagno & Massironi, 2006).
Given that a painting could be seen under various illumination
conditions, from natural to artiﬁcial lights, how can the colors be
reliably conveyed? One convention may be to over-emphasize
the contrasts of the edges between objects. Chevreul (1839) is
widely acknowledged for providing an early empirical description
of simultaneous color contrast that has inﬂuenced both vision sci-
entists and artists, in particular impressionists and pointillists.
Opposing colors, especially red versus green and blue versus yel-
low, enhance each others’ contrasts when they are placed side byFig. 6. Simultaneous color contrast. The green surfaces are adjacent to surfaces in red and
Yale University Art Gallery.side. The effect is most spectacular when the colors on the canvas
are mostly from one pair of opposing colors, as in ‘‘The Night Café”
by Vincent van Gogh (1888) (Fig. 6). Emphasizing color contrasts
might be a convention that helps maintain color constancy irre-
spective of the illumination conditions.
The effects of color contrast take a new dimension when the
depicted surfaces are small. The perceived color of a small
patch is then very much affected by the background. However,
recent research has shown that the shift in perceived color of
the patch is larger when the background is itself composed of
small regions rather than being uniform (Fig. 7a; Monnier &
Shevell, 2003). This ﬁnding might provide a new perspective
on pointillist paintings where small patches of color covering
the whole canvas were preferred over large uniform color re-
gions (Fig. 7b).
Within the contemporary view of the human visual system,
the processing of color is split between luminance and chromi-
nance pathways (e.g. Livingstone & Hubel, 1987). While natural
objects are determined both by luminance and chrominance,
some objects can therefore be deﬁned exclusively from their
luminance properties (i.e. different gray levels) and others from
their chromatic properties (i.e. hue and saturation). In addition,
the chrominance channel contributes weakly to the perception
of three-dimensional position and movement. This view led Liv-
ingstone (2002) to propose that if an object is painted with a
color that is equiluminant to (i.e. that has no luminance differ-
ence with) its background, that object should be difﬁcult to
maintain at a ﬁxed position and its boundaries might be difﬁcult
to determine. Let us take the example of the ‘‘Coquelicots” by
Claude Monet (1873) (Fig. 8a). The red poppies are near equilu-
minance to the green grass (Fig. 8b), maybe helping the impres-
sion that the poppies shiver in the wind.
In summary, it seems that conventions on the light source posi-
tions match well humans preferences for a placement above their
head and slightly to the left. In contrast, the color of objects appear
to follow conventions that emphasize the outlines of objects. While
these conventions may be inspired from studies of color perception
(Chevreul, 1839), they are not directly linked to speciﬁc prior con-
straints used by the visual system.orange tones. Vincent van Gogh (1888) ‘‘The Night Café”. Oil on canvas, 72  92 cm;
Fig. 7. (a) Apparent color shifts from textured background. The central ring in all four donut shapes is identical but has different color appearances depending on the
background. The color shift is stronger when the background is itself composed of small rings (top ﬁgures) rather than uniform (bottom ﬁgures). Reprinted from Monnier and
Shevell (2003). (b) Example of the use of small patches of color contrasts in pointillism. Red surfaces are placed next to green ones but a close examination of the painting
shows that each surface is itself composed of numerous small patches. Georges Seurat (1884) ‘‘Un dimanche après-midi à l’Île de la Grande Jatte” (detail in top-left corner). Oil
on canvas, 207  308 cm; Helen Birch Bartlett Memorial Collection, 1926.224; The Art Institute of Chicago (http://www.artic.edu/aic).
Fig. 8. Movement from equiluminance. (a) The red poppies are mostly deﬁned from the color contrast with the green grass. Claude Monet (1873) ‘‘Coquelicots”. Oil on canvas,
50  65 cm; Musée d’Orsay, Paris. (b) A detail of the same painting transformed to grey-scale suggests that the poppies are close to be equiluminant to the background.
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Apart from composition and scaling effects, not knowing
where the observer will stand in front of a painting can have
dramatic effects on the interpretation of a depicted three-dimen-
sional scene. Even if the painter has mastered the laws of linear
perspective as they were derived at the beginning of the ﬁf-
teenth century, all viewpoints except one should theoretically
lead to geometrical deformations of the scene. The only view-
point from where the painting is a faithful rendition of the scene
is the center of projection, that is the location where the painter
was standing if the scene was painted on a transparent canvas.
Therefore, there is a fundamental ambiguity in the geometry of
the depicted scene that depends on where the observer is
standing.
The ambiguity on the geometry of the three-dimensional scene
is an issue for museums but also for everyday perception as images
seen from the wrong viewpoint abound in magazines, billboards or
even movie theaters. Luckily, human observers rarely notice thedeformations of the scene, a phenomenon known as La Gournerie’s
paradox. The resolution of this paradox is still a matter of debate.
Some people argue that observers are just not sensitive to these
deformations because of the nature of their internal representation
of the three-dimensional world, namely a representation that is
insensitive to the type of stretches that occur when one is not
placed at the center of projection (Cutting, 1988). Other people ar-
gue that the deformations are not perceived because the observer
has been able to calibrate herself, and then interpret the scene
from the correct center of projection (Goldstein, 1987). To this
end, the observer could use two kinds of information. First, there
is some information in the frame and the canvas texture that helps
determine the orientation of the canvas relative to the observer
(Vishwanath, Girshick, & Banks, 2005). Second, there is some infor-
mation in the depicted scene, such as the knowledge of the way the
image of a cube is deformed when seen from different viewpoints
(Kubovy, 1986). There is some evidence that human observers use
such a rectangularity constraint, that is the belief that by default
edges of objects are rectangular (Mamassian, 1998).
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guity of the three-dimensional layout associated to not knowing
where the observer stands? One convention seems the prevalence
of depicting geometrical objects that have a regular shape. The
classical example of these objects are ﬂoor tiles that are over-
whelmingly present in Renaissance paintings. The fact that tiles
are almost always square, rather than an arbitrary aspect ratio,
can help determine the proper center of projection for the painting.
However, some objects resist the fore-shortening deformations
they should undergo (Kubovy, 1986). For instance, in ‘‘The School
of Athens” by Raphael (1510–1511) (see again Fig. 1b), the two
spheres at the bottom right that represent the globe of the earth
and the sphere of the ﬁxed stars should project as oblong discs be-
cause of their eccentricity relative to the vanishing point. That the
spheres are represented as circles rather than ellipses probably re-
ﬂects the over-generalization of the fact that when we foveate a
sphere, its retinal image is always a circular disc.
Other ambiguities of the three-dimensional layout can be found
in the geometry of reﬂection. Mirrors and other specular surfaces
are difﬁcult to perceive because of confounding factors between
the material properties, the objects surrounding the surface and
the illumination conditions. Everyday perception seems to use
knowledge of the statistics of illumination rather than contextual
objects to make sense of glossy surfaces (Fleming, Dror, & Adelson,
2003). In contrast, artists seem to play carefully with the place-
ment of contextual objects near the mirrors. In particular, one con-
vention seems to represent the face of a depicted person in the
mirror, even though, from an optical point of view, her face cannot
be visible to both herself and the observer. This convention, some-
times called the ‘‘Venus effect” (Fig. 9), is effective because human
observers have a naive understanding of physics (Bertamini, Latto,
& Spooner, 2003). However, there are other examples related to
reﬂections, for instance with respect to the size and the orientation
of the reﬂected image, that suggest that artists used our miscon-
ception of optical reﬂections to depict a scene as they wanted it
to be rather than veridically (Bertamini & Parks, 2005; Cavanagh,
2008).
In summary, it appears that to overcome the ambiguities on
three-dimensional layout that are caused by the unknown view-
point chosen by the observer, the convention to use regular shapesFig. 9. The Venus effect. Most observers trust that Venus is seeing her reﬂection in this
show us Venus’ face or is Venus looking at us? Diego Velázquez (1647–1651) ‘‘The Toilet
London.such as square tiles may be related to a generic perceptual prior to
assume that objects have rectangular corners. In contrast, there are
other conventions that appear unrelated to visual perception, such
as the depiction of spheres as circles and the depiction of faces in
mirrors.
6. Shape
Not knowing where the observer is will have effects on the
perceived three-dimensional layout of the depicted scene, but
also on the shape of the objects in the scene. Both two-dimen-
sional (2 D) and three-dimensional (3 D) objects will be affected.
In 2 D, there is an ambiguity on the aspect ratio of an object be-
cause an object seen from the side will undergo fore-shortening
that will reduce its size along the slant direction. In 3 D, there is
an ambiguity on the curvature of an object, because a concave
object seen from below can produce the same image as a convex
object seen from above. This latter ambiguity is well illustrated
in a lithograph print from M. C. Escher (1955) called ‘‘Convex
and Concave”.
The ambiguity on the aspect ratio of 2 D objects may be re-
solved if we assume that objects have by default a unitary aspect
ratio. In other words, an ellipse in an image is more likely to be
the projection of a slanted circle (Geisler & Kersten, 2002). The
ambiguity on the curvature of the 3 D object may be resolved if
we assume that the viewpoint of the observer is located above
the scene (Mamassian & Landy, 1998). When the shape is depicted
as a line drawing, two intersecting lines are sufﬁcient to represent
an ‘‘egg” shape when the lines have the same curvature (both con-
vex or both concave). In contrast, when the two line segments have
opposite curvature, they generate the percept of a surface patch
that is shaped as a saddle (Fig. 10a). The ambiguity inherent to
the mapping between line curvature and surface shape can be lift
by using the prior assumption that the object is seen from above
(Mamassian & Landy, 1998).
The conventions on the representation of 2 D and 3 D shapes
seem to match quite well the prior assumptions of the visual sys-
tem. In 2 D, much effort was dedicated to promote the idea that the
golden ratio (or golden section, i.e. 1.618:1) represented the per-
fect proportion of a rectangle (Green, 1995; McManus, 1980). How-painting, even though this is not physically possible. Is this a license of the artist to
of Venus (‘The Rokeby Venus’)”. Oil on canvas, 122.5  177 cm; The National Gallery,
Fig. 10. (a) Correspondence between curved lines in an image and curved surface patches in 3 D space. Two curved line segments in an image are usually interpreted as a
particular surface shape. Reprinted from Mamassian and Landy (1998). (b) William Hogarth (1732) ‘‘A Modern Midnight Conversation”. Etching with engraving in black ink
(detail). The character on the left is holding a bottle with a window reﬂection that helps determine the shape of the bottle.
P. Mamassian / Vision Research 48 (2008) 2143–2153 2151ever, most recent studies found little evidence for a preference
close to the golden ratio (e.g. Ohta, 1999). In contrast, there seems
to be a robust preference for a unity ratio, that is for square ﬁgures
(e.g. Davis, 2007). In 3 D, there is good evidence that artists used
some conventions in line drawings that preceded our understand-
ing of shape perception. Let us take for instance the etching ‘‘A
Modern Midnight Conversation” by William Hogarth (1732)
(Fig. 10b). One character is holding a bottle that shows the reﬂec-
tion of a four-pane window. It is plausible that this reﬂection is
drawn more to help the observer determine the shape of the bottle
than as a realistic representation of the scene. Indeed, the window
would need to be tilted by 45 degrees to produce the oriented
reﬂection, and the external light source at that time of the night
(midnight) would need to be very powerful to produce such an in-
tense reﬂection. This and other properties of line drawings are now
being used in computer graphics to extract the sketch of an object
(e.g. Girshick, Interrante, Haker, & Lemoine, 1999).
7. Movement
The absence of time in a static canvas is obviously a challenge
for an artist who wants to depict a dynamic scene. Not only is there
an ambiguity in the direction and speed of an object when it is fro-
zen in a single frame, but there is also the more basic ambiguity of
knowing whether the object is moving at all. In everyday percep-
tion, there is a prior for slowness that can explain numerous mo-Fig. 11. (a) An example of contrapposto. The body stands on one leg and the other leg is
Copy of Myron (ca. 450 BC) ‘‘Discobolus”. Marble Roman copy after a bronze original, 1
ﬂashes. The movement of a person walking past the camera is ﬁxed by ﬂashing the scetion perception phenomena (Weiss, Simoncelli, & Adelson, 2002).
Using a similar convention in visual arts would be counterproduc-
tive to display a dynamic scene, because that scene would tend to
appear even more static. Artists have therefore struggled to pro-
pose conventions that exaggerate the motion to counteract the
perceptual prior.
An old convention to depict movement in a static ﬁgure is ‘‘dy-
namic balance”, where the impression of movement is brought by
breaking the symmetry of the composition or by placing an objet in
an unstable pose. One can argue that contrapposto is an example of
dynamic balance, where a human ﬁgure stands with one leg sup-
porting most of the body weight and the other leg is free and
slightly ﬂexed. The asymmetrical role of the legs can often be de-
tected by noticing the twist of the shoulders relative to the hips
(Fig. 11a).
Another convention used to depict movement is to present
multiple, superimposed views of the object in motion. Such a
representation corresponds to what one would see under a stro-
boscopic light (rapid sequence of bright ﬂashes). Among the ear-
liest scientiﬁc studies that used stroboscopic ﬂashes are the
representations of human movement by Etienne-Jules Marey
(Fig. 11b). These studies inﬂuenced twentieth century artists
such as Marcel Duchamp and his ‘‘Nu descendant l’escalier”
(1912). Other ways to represent movement include photographic
blur and direction vectors superimposed in the image (for a re-
view, see Cutting, 2002).ﬂexed giving the impression that the discus thrower is about to release his throw.
70 cm; The British Museum, London. (b) Example of movement under stroboscopic
ne at regular intervals. Reprinted from Marey (1884).
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ment are very different from the prior assumptions of the human
observer. These conventions are often violating the structure of
natural images, such as when multiple views are superimposed
as if to simulate a stroboscopic lighting. Other artists have also
used other tricks to produce an impression of motion. For instance,
some Op art paintings, such as the closely packed parallel black
and white lines of ‘‘Fall” by Bridget Riley (1963), create an intrigu-
ing movement perception that may be the result of small involun-
tary eye-movements (Zanker & Walker, 2004). More recently, the
paintings of Patrick Hughes on canvases composed of truncated
pyramids do generate a perception of non-rigidity because the lin-
ear perspective in the scene is in conﬂict with the slant of the can-
vas panes (Papathomas, 2002). These various attempts to produce
an artistic perception of movement may one day reach the status of
convention if they are effective and well accepted by the observers.8. Discussion
Visual perception is ambiguous and visual arts play with these
ambiguities. Ambiguities in visual perception are resolved thanks
to prior constraints that are often derived from the knowledge of
statistics of natural scenes. Ambiguities in visual arts are resolved
thanks to conventions that found their inspirations from percep-
tual priors or, more interestingly, from other sources such as stylis-
tic or arbitrary choices. Of course, not all ambiguities in visual
perception are resolved, as witnessed by the multiple instances
of bistable perception such as the one arising from looking at a
Necker cube. Similarly, not all ambiguities in paintings are re-
solved, and artists probably strive to leave the right amount of
ambiguities to let the observer contribute to his experience in a
personal way.
The purpose of this review was to establish the relationship be-
tween visual prior constraints and artistic conventions. It is evident
from this survey that most conventions have their roots in visual
perception, such as the preference for above illumination that also
presents a bias to the left. On the other hand, some conventions
seem to differ from the priors of visual perception, such as the
exaggerations of color contrasts or the depiction of ﬁgures in a mir-
ror. Dividing the conventions that are perceptually-based from
those that are not might be a fruitful exercise to make sense of
what at ﬁrst glance could appear as a bag of artistic tricks
(Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999). Visual art is different from vi-
sual perception, and one important difference might come from
the conventions that differ from perceptual priors.
One can be sure that as vision scientists unravel visual ambigu-
ities and constraints, and art historians report artistic conventions,
there will always be an artist to violate these principles and pro-
mote a new style. However, these styles only make sense when
one refers to the conventions they attack. What would be fauvism
and the bewildering colors in Matisse paintings without centuries
of hard work and conformism to reproduce colors as faithfully as
possible? How could we understand cubism and the deconstructed
ﬁgures of Picasso without referring to the constraint of a unitary
viewpoint? Among these violations of conventions, ‘‘The Annunci-
ation” by Crivelli (1486) is a playful painting full of amusing de-
tails, in particular the artist’s decision to place completely
irrelevant characters near the central vanishing point.
One practical application of the appreciation of ambiguities and
conventions in visual arts is in product design. An attractive new
product should be a compromise between its innovations and
the ease with which it can be used. Understanding how to use a no-
vel object presents some similarities with appreciating or not a
painting. People working in product design often see the interac-
tion with an object as a set of affordances (e.g, You & Chen,2007), but some of these affordances can probably be redeﬁned
as conventions (Norman, 1999). As such, product design offers an
interesting and practical forum to investigate the role of ambigui-
ties and conventions in visual arts.
There are a lot of similarities in the work of artists and scientists
(Kemp, 1990). But there are also differences. Nick Wade rightly
notes that ‘‘Artists enhance and elaborate the effects, whereas
scientists contract and constrain them.” (Wade, 2003). More con-
tact with visual arts can maybe help expand the horizon of some
vision scientists.
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